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The Impact of Liberalisation Policies on Inequality in Africa 
 
 
Abstract 
 
  
Despite over three decades of Liberalisation policies in Africa, income-inequality has stayed 
persistently high. Using updated panel data of 26 African countries spanning the period 1996-
2010, this study examines the effect of liberalisation policies with particular focus on 
financial, trade, institutional, political and economic liberalisations on income-inequality.  We 
find:  that financial liberalisation has a levitated income-redistributive effect with the 
magnitude of the de jure measure (KAOPEN) higher than that of the de facto measure (FDI); 
that exports, trade and ‘freedom to trade’ have an equality incidence on income-distribution;  
and that institutional and political liberalisation has a negative impact and we also find that, 
economic freedom has a negative income-redistributive effect possibly because of the weight 
of its legal component. The impact of these policies implications are discussed in detail in this 
study. 
 
JEL Classification: F30; F41; F50; O15; O55 
 
Keywords:  Liberalisation Policies; Income Inequality; Poverty; Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction  
Most African countries under the umbrella of the Bretton Wood Institutions, embarked on a 
series of structural adjustment policies in which economic, trade and institutional 
liberalisation were central. These Liberalisation policies encompass government policies that 
promote free trade, deregulation, elimination of subsidies, price controls and rationing system, 
and, often, the downsizing or privatization of public services (Woodward, 1992).    
The goal of financial reforms is to give an impetus to economic growth as well as improving 
overall economic and financial efficiency (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992). In the first generational 
reforms, measures adopted included: abolishing explicit controls on the pricing and allocation 
of credit, reduction of direct government intervention in bank credit decisions, relaxing of 
controls on international capital movements and allowing  interest rates to be market 
determined. The second generation of reforms targeted structural and institutional constraints, 
improved legal, regulatory, supervisory and institutional environments; restored bank 
soundness and rehabilitated the financial infrastructure (Batuo et al., 2010).  
The proponents of trade liberalisation imagine that removing trade barriers will lead to a short 
term welfare gain and in turn reduce poverty and income inequality. They expected trade 
liberalisation to stimulate economic growth and in the medium term to reap the static 
(efficiency) benefits of trade which could look rather like growth. In the long run potential 
positive forces include: access to technology and to appropriate intermediate and capital 
goods; the benefits of scale and competition; the flexibility induced by relying on market 
signals, and the constraints on government incompetence or corruption, see Grossman and 
Helpmann (1991), Lucas (1988).  By taking advantage of the fact that countries are endowed 
with different resource, and therefore some countries have more of a particular resource than 
others, there could be the opportunity for financial gain for that country. The barriers imposed 
on economies under protection regimes create inefficient production in that country. When 
these barriers are removed the country can trade efficiently again and take advantage of the 
resources that the country is particularly endowed with.   
The issues regarding institutions affecting inequality was tackled because most scholars 
believe that economic reform failure may be the outcome of political circumstances, 
protecting the interests of the narrow political, –industrial elite (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
The surge of interest by institutions coincided with the shift of concerns, among international 
agencies and western governments, about the role of the state in promoting growth and 
reducing poverty and inequality in developing countries, specifically in Africa.  The origin of 
this concern was the setbacks and failures of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and 
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the normative and functional ideals of the politics of neo liberal thinking which was at the 
heart of the Bretton Wood Institution strategies (Leftwich, 1993:606; Campbell, 2001:157). 
Primarily, the objective was one of adjustment thereby attempting to shatter the dominant post 
war state led development approach and overcome the problem of economic stagnation by 
promoting open and competitive market economies, supervised by minimal state intervention. 
Adjustment involved profound change in the use, production and distribution of resources, 
giving rise to both winners and losers. Losers often included bureaucrats, public sector 
workers, party officials, farmers and manufacturers, who suffered from a reduction in the size 
of public services, a diminution in the power of the party state, more competition, and from a 
withdrawal of subsidies and free trade. But the burden of change fell more on the poor who 
lost free services and experienced steep increases in basic necessities and consumer prices as 
well as in medical and educational costs. These hardships led to protests in many countries 
which called for a review of the centrality of political factors and of the role of the state in the 
adjustment process. It became clear that the ability to design and implement adjustment 
programs was largely a consequence of political commitment, capacity and skill, as well as 
bureaucratic competence, independence and probity (Leftwich, 1993:607).  
This paper will highlight three main strands. Firstly, the effect of capital accounts 
liberalisation on inequality and poverty. Cobham (2001) has argued that, while the growth 
benefits of liberalisation are far from clear for poorer countries, there may be a significant 
cost in poverty terms. The author concludes by inviting more scholarly research in this area. 
The persistently high rates of inequality and poverty being experienced in the African 
continent after more than two decades of reform bear out Cobhams recommendation, which 
inspires this paper.  
The impact of trade liberalisation on poverty and inequality has been mixed at best. While 
many advocates identify strong benefits in terms of both resource allocation and economic 
growth (especially in the long-run), others fear that in the short-run,  trade liberalisation puts 
great stress on certain factors in the economy and could even leave substantial poverty behind 
in the long-run (Winters, 2000)1. The estimation approach used in this paper will consider 
both the short and the long-run effects of trade liberalisation in a bid to throw more light on 
the debate.  
                                                 
1
 Others additionally argue that being too open to trade rather than just the process of opening-up exposes an 
economy to shocks that generate uncertainty and causes it to operate with higher levels of poverty than would a 
close economy. They profess that, this ultimately undermines policy measures designed to alleviate poverty and 
redistribute income (Winters,2001).  
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Tebaldi & Mohan in their study on “institutions and poverty”  (2010) have recently shown 
that, an economy with  robust corruption-control, an effective government and a stable 
political system will create conditions to promote growth, minimize income distribution 
conflicts and reduce poverty. Their findings suggest that the quality of the regulatory system, 
rule of law, voice and accountability and expropriation risk is inversely related to poverty. 
With growing scholarly interest in the success of an unorthodox Chinese model, this paper 
seeks to assess the direction of the institutions-inequality nexus in Africa from a very 
inclusive standpoint2.   
Our approach will be to investigate the impact of liberalisation policies on income inequality 
in African countries. Examining whether the liberalisation policies have affected the income 
distribution of everyone equally or they only assist those who are already relatively well off; 
leaving the poor behind. We also examine how they affect income distribution in the various 
countries within the continent, and their effect on short and long runs?   Firstly , we used the 
before and after comparison, to examine the response of the level of income inequality and 
the volatility of income inequality from the time that financial or trade liberalisation took 
place in each country. The results suggest that countries that liberalize their financial sector 
tend to gain in the short run rather than in long run. Next, we used the panel data techniques 
model for a sample of 26 African countries spanning the period 1996-2010 to investigate the 
effect of liberalization policies on income distribution. Findings show that financial, 
institution and political liberalization in different measures tends to increase income 
inequality. Trade liberalization (freedom of trade, openness and export) also tends to reduce 
income inequality even though most of its outcomes are not statistically significant. While in 
general economic reform that contains both financial, trade and institutional reforms there is a 
positive and significant effect on income distribution. 
The main reason that this study contributes substantially to the literature contrary to 
mainstream liberalization-inequality that only focuses on one or two indicators of openness, 
this study uses three principal areas namely financial, trade and institutional or political 
liberalisations and within these areas employs different proxies to represent the sectors and 
                                                 
2
 Six of the eight institutional quality indicators used by Tebaldi & Mohan (2010), will be reduced to one index 
through Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Unlike providing the individual effects of different institutional 
dynamics like in mainstream literature (Tebaldi & Mohan, 2010), we shall provide the incidence of institutional 
liberalisation on poverty with a single variable.  
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also includes the economic freedom index 3 to summarise all the various reforms. This study 
is exclusively focused on Africa since scholarly attention on inequality literature has not been 
African-oriented owing to a lack of relevant data.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines existing literature. Data and 
methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to 
empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 5.  
 
2. Existing literature  
2.1 Theory and empirical evidence 
There is an enormous amount of literature on the effects of the individual liberalisation 
policies on inequality and poverty but it is difficult to find any literature on policy interaction 
concurrently with income inequality. We discuss below our theory and provide empirical 
evidence.  
The mainstream theory was that financial liberalisation was based on a supposed link between 
financial development, and economic growth, and it was thought that this theory could be put 
into practice and reduces poverty and income inequality. Financial liberalisation has two 
dimensions which are domestic financial sector deregulation and the opening of a capital 
account.  The reason for financial deregulation, including international financial liberalisation, 
can be traced back to the seminal contribution in the early 1970s by McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973). They advocated financial liberalisation to combat financial repression and also 
claimed that one of the reasons for the poor growth performance for many developing 
countries had been administratively determined at a very low real interest rate which 
discouraged savings and encouraged inefficient use of capital.  Therefore, financial 
liberalisation – primarily involving deregulation of interest rate- would lead to higher level of 
savings. Liberalisation would also channel funds to finance more productive projects. 
Therefore, an increase in the real interest rate following liberalisation should encourage 
saving and expand the supply of credit available to domestic investors, thereby enabling the 
economy to grow more quickly. The growth promoting effect of domestic financial sector 
deregulation should be enhanced by opening a capital account on the balance of payment, 
                                                 
3
 Integrating many liberalization indicators into the equation is on the premise that sustained economic and political reforms 
must be explicitly linked to reap the benefits of structural adjustment programs in sub-Saharan Africa (Gordon, 1996).  
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which would allow more foreign capital to flow into the country attracted by higher domestic 
real interest rates. 
Although increases in real interest rates have always been the outcome of liberalisation 
experiences, their impact on domestic saving and investment has been mixed (Reinhart and 
Loannis, 2008; Galbis, 1993). Mckinnon recognized that financial liberalisation may lead to 
episodes of over borrowing. This over borrowing syndrome may be magnified when domestic 
liberalisation is coupled with capital account liberalisation (Mckinnon and Pill, 1999). A 
banking crisis is often preceded by financial liberalisation; indeed liberalisation often leads to 
crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). A world bank study for the period 1980-1995 found 
that banking crises were more likely to occur in liberalized financial system ( Demirguc-kunt 
and Detragiache,1999) . A study by the Inter-American Development Bank (2007) of 17 Latin 
American countries for the period 1977-2000 found that financial liberalisation has had a 
significant effect on increasing inequality and poverty  
Differing from the supportive view of financial liberalisation, a number of critical views have 
been raised stressing the downside risk of financial liberalisation. One prominent critical view 
was from Stiglitz (2000), who argued that financial liberalisation by itself, does not abate the 
asymmetric information problem, and may prevent financial intermediation from becoming 
more efficient in a liberalised market. He pointed out in an early paper with Weiss (1981) that 
if asymmetric information is an inherent feature of an otherwise competitive market economy, 
credit rationing may arise even without government intervention. He also pointed out that 
financial liberalisation has the potential to aggravate information problems. This can happen if 
banks have to cope with increasing competitive pressure causing them to refrain from 
relationship leading, and borrowers may therefore have more opportunity to look for the 
cheapest way of financing their investment. Hellmann et al.(2000) argue that liberalisation 
reduces the franchise value of banks which makes them more prone to financial disruption 
and stimulates risk taking in order to try to increase profits under the pressure of falling 
interest rate margins. 
There exists important channels by which financial liberalisation might change the shape of 
income distribution. One study carried out by Galor and Zeira (1993) looked at the domestic 
dimension of financial liberalisation, and found that credit market imperfections such as 
asymmetric information induces banks to restrict leading to low income groups. Thus, these 
income groups will not benefit from the decreasing cost of external financing in the wake of 
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interest rate liberalisation. In turn, they will be less likely to start a business and create wealth. 
As a result, the income distribution becomes more unequal since the proceeds of 
entrepreneurial activity and wealth accumulation accrue primarily in those individuals in the 
upper part of income distribution. Another contribution was that of Batuo et al., (2010) in a 
study restricted to African countries, strongly arguing that its impact on poverty and income 
distribution has been negative  
Trade Liberalisation 
Openness and trade liberalisation have been the key components of the Washington 
Consensus most controversial economics policy. These components identify strong benefits in 
terms of both resource allocation and economic growth based on the theoretical support of the 
Hecksher-Ohlin, that predicts that trade openness will lead to great specialisation and a rise in 
the national income of all participating countries, following a more rational global allocation 
of production inspired by the principle of comparative advantage.  In countries where labour 
is abundant, trade liberalisation is to switch production from inefficient capital intensive 
import substitutes to efficient labour intensive exports. As result of this theory, Stolper and 
Samuelson assume that such shifts will lead to a convergence in the price of goods exchange 
and in factor remunerations. Due to this, domestic inequality is expected to decline in 
countries endowed with an abundant labour supply and to rise in those with an abundant 
endowment of capital, as the demand and remuneration for the latter will increase, while the 
demand and remuneration for labour will fall. Despite this, there are some opponents to these 
policies. There is a general recognition that in the long run open economies do better   in 
aggregate than closed ones, and that relatively open policies contribute to long run 
development. Many observers fear that in the short run trade liberalisation puts greater 
pressure on certain sectors of the economy and that even in the long run successful open 
regimes may leave behind some poverty. Meanwhile others argue that being open-rather than 
just the process of opening up- exposes an economy to shock that generates uncertainty,  and 
causes it to operate with higher levels of poverty than  a closed economy would and 
undermines policy measures designed to alleviate poverty and redistribute income.  
However, the empirical evidence of the impact of trade liberalisation on inequality is mixed 
and does not always support the conclusion of the H0-SS model. Several studies indicate the 
equalising effect of free trade such as that of Bourguignon and Morrison, 1989 who argue that 
the removal of trade protection in manufacturing reduces the income share of the richest 20 
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percent of the population and raises that of the bottom 60 percent in an analysis of 35 
developing countries. Alarcon and McKinley, 1998 also came to this conclusion in their case 
study of Mexico experience from 1985 to 1990 which indicted that increasing openness raised 
inequality, owing to the contraction of a high skill import substituting sector, the expansion of 
the semi skilled sector and the contraction of the low skill intensive sector due to rising import 
from low income countries, (Wood, 1995). Savvides, 1999 found that the most open 
developing countries experience a rise in inequality between the 1980s and the early 1990s, 
and a positive correlation between trade protection and the income share of the poorest 
quintile.  
In Africa, there is an increasing interest in the role played by trade policy in relation to 
economic performance (Rodrik, 1998). This is due largely to the disappointing economic 
performance of several countries in the region in the 1980 and 1990 and attempts to explain 
why they have not done well relative to other developing countries in Asia and Latin 
America. Various explanations have been adduced for Africa‘s dismal economic 
performance. These include poor domestic economic policies, geography, colonial legacy, 
political instability, weak institutions, and an inhospitable external environment. While it is 
generally acknowledged that the inward looking trade policies pursued in the region since 
independence contributed to its poor export performance, links to growth performance are not 
well established (Rodrik, 1998). 
Institutional or Political Liberalisation  
There is a huge amount of literature on the relationship between institutions and aspects of 
poverty and inequality at both a theoretical and empirical level and in a number of disciplines. 
The interaction between institutions, poverty and inequality has been debated from different 
perspective depending on authors’ orientations. 
From an economic perception, poverty and inequality are considered to be the result of the 
nature and character of the relationship between the production and distribution of scarce 
resources and incapacity to adequately produce the basic necessities of life. However, a 
production process which negatively affected production capacity did not happen in a 
vacuum, but it mediated by a particular institutional configuration, meaning that production  is 
influenced by the socio-economic and political structural or institutional setting in which they 
took place. As Novak observed: “despite popular mythology, poverty has not always been 
with us…. Poverty as we know it, is a much more recent and historically specific 
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phenomenon. it occurred at certain points in history, and is tied to a particular form of 
economic and social organisation” (Novak, 1993:3).  
Bates’ (1999) argument that, in order to understand the nature and character of the economies 
of developing countries or “the politics and the economics growth”, the roles of both 
economic and non-economic institutions (particularly the wide variety of social institutional 
forms) within which development initiative take place is imperative. She provides a 
justification for the primacy of institutional analysis, firstly, by offering ways of 
understanding the economic significance of the features of developing societies and cultures 
that market based reasoning might misunderstand or ignore, and secondly, by showing how an 
exploration of the political and economic institutional configurations helps in understanding 
group dynamics, power relations and resource flow and control.  Generally she believes that 
the restructuring of political institutions (specifically, the reorganisation of the structure of  a 
government) and economic institutions does inhibit the capacity of the government, groups 
and individual persons in their struggle for material production by influencing their access to 
and control over the key resources.  
Berggren’s (1999) assessment found some evidence that increasing economic freedom can 
decrease income inequality.  Chang and Calderon (2000), taking a cross sectional approach 
with a sample covering 70 developing and developed countries, found that institutional 
quality, measured by a composite index based on political risk data by International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) and Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) displays a 
quadratic relationship with income inequality. For poor economies institutional quality is 
positively linked with income inequality, but the inverse holds for rich economies. 
Chong and Gradstein’s (2007) study employs a large panel of countries which consists of ex-
colonies (including the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). They  used a composite 
index of institutional developments consisting of political right and civil liberties, political 
stability, government effectiveness, limits to government regulation and adherence to rule of 
law and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the correlation between income inequality 
and a number of institutional indicators capturing democratic and institutional stability 
aspects.  Their results showed that better institutions predict a reduction in income inequality, 
as well as increasing inequality they predict poorer institutional quality. 
Very few studies have assessed the political dimensions which restrict to African countries. 
According to Hickey (2005), Uganda offers a particularly interesting ‘case study’ for the 
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political analysis of poverty reduction, given that its success in reducing poverty in the 1990s 
has been closely associated with ‘getting the politics right’. The country offers a showcase for 
the type of politics that can underpin pro-poor policy reforms. Hickey argues that the poorest 
groups in Uganda are both under and misrepresented by the government’s poverty reduction 
policies and broader development projects. Employing the concept of political space reveals 
close insights into the ways in which chronic poverty is represented in the country. Hickey 
concludes by stating that the Uganda case study suggests that a system of direct democracy 
has enabled a more sustained period of pro-poor policy reform and greater inclusion for 
marginal voices throughout the political system than is generally the case under multiparty 
representative democracy. This study will investigate the Uganda hypothesis using a panel of 
African countries as in Gordon’s (1996)4 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We assess a sample of 28 African countries with annual data from the African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB), Chinn & Ito (2002) and Gwartney et al. (2011) for 
the period 1996 to 2010. The limitation to a 15 year span is based on constraints in 
institutional indicators which only saw the light of day in 1996. Other issues on data 
availability limit our sample to 28 countries out of 53 African countries but in the sample we 
have the most important African countries in term of population and GDP Growth. Summary 
statistics and presentation of countries (Table 2), correlation analysis (Table 3) and variable 
definitions (Table 4) are presented in the appendices. The descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the panel regressions show that there is a fair degree of variation in the data utilised so 
that one should be confident that reasonable estimated relationships should emerge. Both the 
standard deviations and minimum/maximum values validate this assertion and further support 
the inappropriateness of a linear model that assumes a particular functional distribution. The 
purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate issues of overparametisation and multi 
collinearity.  Based on the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any serious 
problems in terms of the relationships to be estimated.  
The measure for inequality is the GINI coefficient which appreciates disparity among values 
of the frequency income-distribution. A value of zero expresses perfect equality while a 
coefficient of one denotes maximal inequality. The GINI coefficient which is commonly used 
                                                 
4
 On “sustaining economic reforms under political liberalisation in Africa”, Gordon (1996) has emphasized that 
the gains to be reaped from economic reforms will only be fully realized in conjunction with improvements in 
governance and expansion of democratic representation.  
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as a measure of income distribution or wealth has found application in diverse disciplines 
studying inequality, such as sociology, economics, health science, agriculture, etc.  
In this study we distinguish between four areas of liberalisation policy: financial, trade, 
institutional and political liberalisation.  Financial liberalisation is measured by: de jure 
capital account openness (KAOPEN), developed by Chinn & Ito (2002); and de facto capital 
account openness (foreign direct investment: FDI). KAOPEN is the first principal component 
of four binary variables in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and it takes higher values for more open financial regimes. 
We are poised to add subtlety to the analysis by complementing KAOPEN with FDI because: 
the former may not capture the actual ebb and flow of cross border capital and its impact 
(Aizenman et al., 2009); the private sector often circumvents capital account restrictions, 
nullifying the expected effect of regulatory capital controls (Edwards, 1999) and; more 
recently, China’s de facto openness, despite its de jure closeness has been subject to 
discussion in research circles (Prasad & Wei, 2007; Aizenman & Glick, 2009; Shah & 
Patnaik, 2009).  
Trade liberalisation is measured by trade openness, exports and freedom to trade. While 
openness is the sum of imports and exports of commodities as a % of GDP, the export is only 
consists of commodity exports on GDP. Freedom of trade is a component of the Economic 
Freedom Index and combines measures of trade taxes, tariff rates and trade barriers and 
capital control to create a composite index. 
 For Institutional liberalisation, we use a principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the 
dimensions of government effectiveness, corruption control, rule of law, regulation quality, 
voice and accountability and political stability. PCA is a widely used statistical technique 
applied to reduce a larger set of correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated 
variables called principal components (PC) that represent most of the information in the 
original data set. In the selection of the PCs, the criteria applied to determine how many 
common factors to retain are taken from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). Therefore, only 
PCs with an eigenvalue greater than one are retained. As shown in Table 2, the first PC is 
appropriate since it has an eigenvalue of 4.705 and represents more than 78% of information 
in the institutional indicators combined. The first PC will subsequently represent the 
Institutional Liberalization Index (instidex).  
For political liberalisation, we exploit as proxy the Polity Index which is a combined polity 
score, which varies from 10(strongly democratic) to -10(strongly autocratic), and is obtained 
from the polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2003). The polity variable was designed to record 
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the regimes institutional authority characteristics. Firstly, the dataset recorded a democracy 
score (ranging from 0 to 10) for each country, based on the openness of the political process, 
defined as the extent to which citizens can effectively express preference about policies and 
leader through elections and the degree of restraints on the power of the chief executive. 
Secondly, each country has an autocracy (again ranging from 0 to 10) based on how political 
leaders are selected (by designation or chosen from a closed list), the constraints on their 
powers and regulations and the competitiveness of political participation. 
 One of the indicators included in the estimation was the Economic Freedom Index 
(Gwartney, 2011), which has many different components. The components are as follows: 
economic freedom representing, taxes on international trade (international trade tax revenues 
as % of trade sector; mean tariff rate and standard deviation of tariff rates); regulatory trade 
barriers (non-tariff trade barriers and the compliance cost of exporting and importing); the 
size of  the trade sector in relation to that expected; black market exchange rates and 
international market capital controls (‘foreign ownership /investment’ restrictions and capital 
controls). Economic freedom broadly represents: the freedom to trade internationally; the 
legal structure and security of property rights; access to sound money; size of government 
(expenditures, taxes and enterprises) and; the regulation of credit, labour and business.  
Control variables include: inflation, government expenditure and economic prosperity (GDP 
growth). We expect: high inflation to fuel inequality (Albanesi, 2007) and low inflation to 
reduce it (Bulir, 1998; Lopez, 2004); government expenditure to not be tainted by corrupt 
malpractices that mitigate inequality and, GDP growth to reduce inequality condition that 
even distribution of the fruits of economic prosperity. The impact on inequality of the last two 
control variables is contingent on the quality of the institutions. 
Figure.1 presents the partial regression coefficient between income inequality and the 
liberalisation policies for the whole sample. The different slopes do not seem to be determined 
by outliers but rather seem to reflect a robust pattern in the data. It can be noticeably 
understood that the relationship between income inequality and political openness, export 
freedom of trade economic freedom, FDI and institutional liberalisation is much harsher and 
tends to increase inequality, with only capital account openness decreasing inequality.   
Figure. 2 indicate2 the poverty headcount at 1.25$ a day (PPP) and 2$ a day(PPP) tend to 
reduce with respect to freedom trade, trade openness, institutional and capital account 
liberalisation while increases in respect to political and FDI Liberalisation.    
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3.2 Estimation technique  
We assessed two main issues in this study. Firstly, we investigate the incidence of various 
liberalization policies on inequality. This involved assessing the income redistributive impacts 
of financial, trade, institutional, political and other liberalisation policies.  
In order to achieve the objectives above, we conducted a panel data analysis. This estimation 
technique has some important advantages and one disadvantage when compared to cross-
country analysis (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008). One advantage is that it makes use both of 
time-series and the cross sectional variation in the data. In cross-country regression, the 
unobserved country-specific effect is part of the error term, so that correlation between the 
error term and the explanatory variables results in biased estimated coefficients. Also, in 
cross-country regressions, if the lagged dependent variable is included among the regressors, 
the country-specific effect is certainly correlated with the regressors. A means of controlling 
the presence of unobserved country-specific effects is to first-difference the regression 
equation to eliminate the country-specific effect, and then use instrumental variables to 
control for endogeneity. Endogeneity is another advantage of dynamic panel data analysis. 
Uncontrolled endogeneity can substantially bias estimates and lead to inappropriate 
inferences. Dynamic panel data analysis takes care of this endogeneity issue by using lagged 
values of regressors as instruments.  
The main issue associated with dynamic panel data analysis is using data averages over 
shorter time spans. This implies that the estimated result will reveal shorter-term impacts and 
not long term effects, which should be kept in mind when interpreting and discussing results.  
We shall overcome this problem by using both ‘full data’ and ‘data averages’. The dynamic 
panel regression model is expressed as follows: 
 
tititiytititititititi WOPITFIqIq ,,,6,5,4,3,21,10, εξησσσσσσσσ ++++++++++= −
  (1)            
 
Where‘t’ stands for the period and ‘i’ represents a country. Iq  is the inequality rate; 1, −tiIq  is 
the lagged value of the inequality rate,  F , financial liberalisation (KAOPEN and FDI); T , is 
trade liberalisation (trade and exports); I , is institutional liberalisation (instidex); P , is 
political liberalisation (Polity IV); O , is other liberalisations (economic freedom and freedom 
to trade).  tiW ,  is a vector of the control variables (government expenditure, inflation and 
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economic prosperity)5 with 106 << y  ,  iη  is a country specific effect,  tξ  is a time specific 
constant and  ti ,ε  is an error term. 
 
Estimates will be unbiased if and only if, the independent variables above are strictly 
exogenous. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the real world because although they have a 
substantial effect on inequality, the reverse effect cannot be ruled out because the 
redistributive quality of income in an economy also has some bearing on the plethora of 
regressors. The regressors could be correlated with the error term ( ti ,ε ).  Country and time 
specific effects could also be correlated with other variables in the model, which is often the 
case with lagged dependent variables included in the equations. Therefore, an issue of 
endogeneity arises owing to endogenous regressors.  A way of dealing with the problem of 
the correlation between the individual specific-effect and the lagged dependent variables 
involves eliminating the individual effect by first differencing. Therefore Eq. (1) becomes:
 
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,, −−−−−− −+−+−+−=− titititititititititi IITTFFIqIqIqIq σσσσ
 
)()()()()( 1,,11,,1,,61,,5 −−−−− −+−+−+−+−+ tititttitiytitititi WWOOPP εεξξσσσ       (2) 
However Eq. (2) presents another issue; estimation by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is still 
biased because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous independent 
variable and the disturbance term. To address this issue, we estimate the regression in 
differences jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation. The procedure uses lagged levels of the regressors as instruments in the 
difference equation, and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in the levels 
equation, thus exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged dependent 
variables and the error term. Between the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 
1991) and system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998), we 
choose the later with respect to Bond et al. (2001, 3-4)6. The system GMM has been 
                                                 
5
 We have already discussed the expected signs of control variables in the Data section.  
6
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the 
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been 
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially 
consistent with standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our empirical 
application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent empirical growth 
research”. Bond et al. (2001, pp.3-4).  
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confirmed to be better in recent liberalisation-poverty studies (Arestis & Caner, 2010; 
Enowbi-Batuo & Kupukile, 20107). 
In specifying the dynamic panel system estimation, we opted for the second-step GMM 
because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity. In the first-step the residuals are 
assumed to be homoscedastic. The assumption of no auto-correlation in the residuals is 
crucial as past lagged variables are to be used as instruments for the dependent variables. 
Also, the estimation depends on the assumption that the lagged values of the dependent 
variable and other independent variables are valid instruments in the regression. When the 
error terms of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the first-order auto-correlation of the 
differenced residuals should be significant while their second-order auto-correlation: AR(2) 
should not be. The validity of the instruments is assessed with the Sargan over-identifying   
0restrictions test (OIR). To sum up, the main arguments for using the system GMM 
estimation are that it does not eliminate cross-country variation, it mitigates potential biases of 
the difference estimator in small samples, and it can control for the potential endogeneity of 
all regressors.  
Beside the control for endogeneity, further robustness of our models is ensured by the 
following: use of both ‘full data’ and ‘average data’ with non-overlapping intervals to capture 
both the long-term and short-run tendencies of estimated coefficients respectively; 
employment of robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) Fixed Effect 
regressions to capture the unobserved heterogeneity; and the use of alternative measures of 
liberalization indicators.  
 
4. Empirical analysis   
4.1 Presentation of results  
The estimation presented in Tables 5-7 have four things in common.  We notice that the initial 
level of inequality is positive and statistically highly significant suggesting that inequality is 
divergence to income inequality across Africa.  The results also report the serial correlation 
test used to examine the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of residuals in first-difference. 
There is overwhelming absence of any significant second order serial correlation across tables 
and specifications. The Sargan OIR test for the validity of the instruments compares the 
                                                 
7
 “To address the potential endogeneity of regressors and to incorporate fixed effects, we employ the system-
GMM estimator from Blundell and Bond (1998). The Blundell-Bond estimator is arguably a superior approach 
to the Arellano-Bond difference-GMM as adding lagged differenced variables as instruments in the level 
equations may generate substantial efficiency gains when the time window is relatively short. Another advantage 
of the system-GMM estimation is its ability to identify the coefficients of time-invariant variables in the level 
equation.”Enowbi-Batuo & Kupulike (2010, p.46).  
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sample moment conditions with their population analogue. The null hypothesis of this test is 
the positions that, the lagged difference of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the 
errors in the level equations. In other words, the instruments explain inequality through no 
other channels beside the endogenous liberalisation regressors, conditional on other covariates 
(control variables). The overwhelming rejection of the null hypothesis of the OIR test (across 
specifications and tables) points to the validity of the instruments. The Wald test for the joint 
significance of estimated coefficients also provides appealing results at the 1% significance 
level. 
 Table 5 (on full data with no overlapping intervals), suggests that, while financial and 
political liberalisation have increased inequality, trade liberalisation has reduced it, and 
column C, suggests that the magnitude of inequality (0.261) resulting from financial 
liberalisation cannot be compensated by the positive income redistributive effect of trade 
liberalisation (-0.016). It is worth pointing out that this comparison is valid because both 
measures in are ratios of GDP.  Also, the absence of no overlapping intervals indicates the 
estimates are long-run.  
Table 6 presents two year non-overlapping interval results. We divided the sample (1996-
2010) into 8 non-overlapping sub-periods. Based on the signs and significance of estimated 
coefficients, the following findings could be established.  Financial liberalisation from de jure 
and de facto capital openness perspectives mitigate income-inequality, with the redistributive 
effect of the former much higher than that of the latter.  Economic freedom, political and 
institutional liberalisation increases inequality. With respect to trade liberalisation, freedom to 
trade has a negative and statistically significant relationship with income-redistributive effect 
while export and trade openness have the same sign but it’s not statistically significant.  
Government expenditure needs to be controlled because of corrupt practices surrounding 
public spending in Africa, especially in investment allocation (Ndikumana, 2008) which has 
increased .   
Table 7 presents ‘Three year non-overlapping interval’ results. We divided the sample (1996-
2010) into 5 non-overlapping sub-periods. The following could be drawn from the findings: 
Financial and trade liberalisation mitigates income inequality. Economic freedom increases 
inequality while ‘freedom to trade’ reduces it.  Inflation and government expenditure have 
appealing and unfavourable redistributive-income effects respectively.  
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4.2. Liberalization Transition and income inequality  
In this section we studied the effect of liberalisation transition on income inequality by using a 
before and after approach to the group of countries that are in our sample.  The sample section 
depends on the availability of the countries data and the year that the countries started to 
undergo liberalisation policies, particularly with regard to trade and financial liberalisation.  
The data and the year each country started the process of trade liberalisation was taken from 
the UNCTAD, (2004b) it shows that the pace of reform differs across countries, but in general 
demonstrates that countries have made substantial progress in opening their economies in the 
1990s. Even though trade policy in Africa is still regarded by some analysts as more 
protectionist than those of its trading partners and competitors (Sharer, 1999; Hinkle, Herrou-
Aragon, and Kubota 2003).The data for the year which was considered as a turning point in 
which countries started external financial liberalization  was based on information found in 
Mehran et al. (1998), Gelbard and Pereira Leite (1999), numerous IMF staff country reports 
for the countries in the sample and Sources obtanied from national monetary authorities in the 
respective countries. 
This analysis is interested in the effects of the change in the income inequality index from the 
year that was considered the turning point of the particular liberalisation policy (trade or 
financial liberalization). Therefore the before and after approach would compare each 
individual country’s income inequality performance from the year of liberalisation, looking at 
five or ten year average of income inequality previously and subsequently from the year the 
liberalisation policy was established.      
The outcome shows that both the 10 and 5 year averages of income inequality for the sample 
of 24 countries before the year of financial liberalisation exhibits a decrease of -6.1 and -1.3 
and more than half the countries exhibit a decline in income inequality (see Table 8). 
Observing the inequality performance of each individual country, we find that homogeneity 
runs across countries, with a 0 standard deviation for the differences between the average of 
10 year before and after turning point. These results confirm the findings that the positive 
effects of financial liberalisation are reaped in the long run.  
With respect to trade liberalisation, results display a minor decline in inequality of -4.1 and -
1.8 for both the 10 and 5 year average of income inequality (See Table 9). The standard 
deviation of the performance of the countries shows a divergent pattern among countries in 
the sample suggesting that, apart from trade liberalisation, the level of income inequality in 
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each country may be affected by numerous factors including the educational system and 
macroeconomic instability. However, the fact that the effect of trade liberalisation has not 
appeared to be so pronounced within the 5 and 10 year averages is evidence that the effect is 
stable in the medium run and long run.     
4.3 Discussion and Policy Implications  
Before discussing the results, it is worthwhile pointing to the circumstances motivating this 
paper. Poverty and inequality undoubtedly remain important challenges to economic and 
human developments. This fact is particularly relevant in Africa where, in spite of over two 
decades of reform poverty and inequality remain stubbornly high. In this paper, we have 
assessed the income-redistributive incidence of various liberalisation policies and our findings 
could be discussed in four strands. 
4.3.1 The Impact of Financial Liberalization  
Financial liberalisation mitigates inequality with the magnitude of the de jure KAOPEN 
indicator higher than that of FDI. The two financial liberalization measures differ principally 
from the perspective that, KAOPEN measures de jure capital openness by accounting for 
regulatory restrictions on capital account transactions, while FDI is capital account openness. 
Thus, KAOPEN tends to increase as capital markets are more liberalised; so with FDI, 
KAOPEN increases. Complementing KAOPEN with FDI to incorporate the effect of external 
financing has been important because, most recently China’s de facto openness, despite its de 
jure closeness has been subject to much discussion in research and policy making circles 
(Prasad & Wei, 2007; Aizenman & Glick, 2009; Shah & Patnaik, 2009). Hence, we can 
establish that based on the magnitude of significance in the financial liberalisation indicators, 
de jure capital openness (KAOPEN) has a more income-redistributive effect than de facto 
capital openness (FDI). It follows that policy measures that favor less restrictions on capital 
account transactions (KAOPEN) and particularly target FDI will have an a substantial 
equalising income distribution effect in the African continent. This recommendation should 
be taken with a caution on ‘naked capital account openness’: “Although financial repression 
is not desirable, its alternative is not traditional liberalisation. When financial liberalisation 
is applied without first maintaining macroeconomic stability and establishing the supporting 
institutions and policies, even when it brings economic expansion, it often comes at the cost of 
devastating crises and increasing economic inequality” (Arestis & Caner, 2004, 23).  
The findings of this paper on capital account liberalisation run counter to mainstream 
literature on several counts. Firstly, Cobham (2001) concluded a decade ago on the effect of 
capital liberalisation on poverty in the following sentence: “The key conclusion is that 
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although the growth benefits of liberalisation are far from clear for poorer countries, there 
may be significant costs in poverty terms. While further research is required in a number of 
areas identified, the main policy implication is that capital controls must be retained as part 
of the toolbox of pro-poor macroeconomic policymaking”. Secondly, Arestis & Caner (2010) 
have found no statistically significant relationship between the degree of capital account 
liberalisation and the poverty rate. Thirdly, there have been relatively few studies focused on 
Africa owing to a lack of relevant data on inequality for the continent8. Using the same time 
span (1980-2002) and measure of inequality, Kai & Hamori(2010) and Asongu (2011a)  have 
used the de facto FDI as a measure of capital account openness and found financial 
liberalization to fuel income-inequality. Besides conceptual and methodological differences, 
the present paper steers clear of those above in its use of updated data.  
 
4.3.2 The Effects of Trade Liberalization and Economic Freedom    
For more subtlety in our analysis, we have used three different measures of trade 
liberalisation: trade; exports and ‘freedom to trade’, all of which significantly mitigate 
income-inequality. Given the primary sector focus on exports in African countries, it is only 
logical that trade liberalisation has an equalisation effect on income-distribution. Also, from 
an import perspective, the influx of affordable Chinese goods could partly explain the 
equalising impact of trade openness.  These findings differ substantially from earlier African 
‘trade liberalisation-inequality’ literature. The literature  states that cross-country evidence has 
shown the positive correlation between trade policies and income inequality through the 
channel of land abundance (Fischer, 2000) and through political economy factors (Easterly, 
2002); intra-household inequality through changes in employment opportunities between male 
and female household members (Winters, 2000b), as well as through changes in the 
composition of the whole workforce (UNDP, 2003); overall inequality tends to rise in Africa 
even if more women are employed with the expansion of textile industries in the wake of 
trade liberalisation (Blackden, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 To the best of our knowledge, there are currently only two empirical studies on the inequality-FDI nexus that 
are Africa focused (Kai & Hamori, 2010; Asongu, 2011a).  
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4.3.3 The Impact of Institutional and Political Liberalisation 
The conventional line of thinking predicts higher institutional quality to be correlated with 
lower poverty rates (Arestis & Caner, 2010). However our findings suggest, institutional 
quality fuels inequality; which has not been unexpected given our initial positive correlation 
between institutional quality and inequality. Even the USA that is credited with benchmark 
institutions has seen its inequality rise over the decades (Stiglitz, 2012; Krueger, 2012)9. As 
postulated by Chong & Calderon (2000) and sustained by Arestis & Caner (2010), a possible 
explanation to this positive association between inequality and institutional quality may be 
understood from transaction costs on the poor. According to them, after liberalisation 
(reform), the poor have to learn new mechanisms to survive, as the former mechanisms are no 
longer useful. Such transaction costs may be high, especially for the poorest and least 
educated category of the lower-income strata.  
The positive impact of political liberalisation (democratisation) on inequality is not 
unexpected in Africa. The advent of democratisation doesn’t really bring alongside good 
politicians that equitably share the fruits of economic prosperity. The case of many 
developing countries in Southeast Asia (Scott, 1972), India (Wade, 1985) and Turkey (Sayari, 
1977); post-communist countries like Russia (Varsee, 1997) and many Latin American 
countries upon the waves of democratisation (Weyland, 1998) confirm this fact. It is in this 
vein that Asongu (2011b) advises that democracy once initiated in Africa should be 
accelerated to edge the appeals of authoritarian regimes and reap the benefits of time and level 
hypotheses.  
Economic freedom has been observed to have a positive incidence on income-distribution. Its 
positive effect on inequality may be due to the weight of its legal structure component: which 
is undoubtedly positively associated with the institutional impact to be covered below and this 
finding is supported by evidence from Atkinson and Brandoline, 2003 whi point out that the 
overall liberalisation policies may have led to an increase in domestic inequality, especially in 
economies with weak institutions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9According to Stiglitz (2012), the magnitude of inequality in the USA has dramatically increased. The fraction of  
the income that goes to the upper 1% has almost tripled since the 1980s. In the same vein, Krueger (2012) has 
affirmed that the share of all income accruing to the top 1% increased by 13.5% from 1997 to 2007; which is the 
equivalent of shifting $1.1 trillion of annual income to the top 1% of families. Put another way, the increased in 
the share of income going to the top 1% over this period exceeds the total amount of income that the entire 
bottom 40% of household receives.  
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4.3.4 On the Effect of Control Variables  
The main control variables such as Government expenditure may or may not reduce 
inequality, depending on how the expenditure is allocated to different social classes in the 
country (Arestis & Caner, 2010). In this paper, this variable has consistently been noticed to 
increase income-inequality. This could be the case when strong institutions are not in place to 
oversee the execution of public investments. Hence, the positive association between public 
investment and corrupt bureaucrats seeking to increase capital expenditure (over maintenance 
expenditure) to maximise private gains and rent-seeking (Ndikumana, 2008,). The inflation 
rate was also included to control the macroeconomic environment and was expected to either 
have a positive or negative sign depending on its rate. Though inflation has been generally 
seen to fuel inequality (Albanesi, 2007) owing to decreased purchasing power, low inflation 
however has a negative incidence on inequality (Bulir, 1998; Lopez, 2004). The relative low 
inflation rate in the descriptive statistics confirms this later inflationary effect.   Controlling 
for economic prosperity, the expected sign of the estimated coefficient was negative. The 
absence of any significant nexus between GDP growth and income-inequality confirms 
growing fears that the relatively high growth rates enjoyed by African countries (4.27% in the 
mean) does not trickle down from the macro-economic to the micro-economic level. There 
are many explanations to this uneven distribution of macro-economic prosperity. However, 
we shall point only two that can be backed by our findings.  Institutional liberalization and 
government expenditure have been found to fuel income-inequality above; implying the 
quality of  institutions are not conducive to oversee the fruits of economic prosperity  trickling 
down to the microeconomic level through government expenditure.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We examined the impact of liberalisation policies specifically financial, trade, institutional 
and economic liberalisations and we also examined their impact on income inequality, using 
an up to date dataset covering (1996-2010), in a sample of countries restricted to Africa. We 
applied two methods, the dynamic panel econometric method and the “before and after” 
approach. In the first method, findings showed that financial liberalisations tend to escalate 
income inequality for the de jure measure (KAOPEN) than for the de facto measure (FDI): 
the outcome of trade liberalisations is mixed and not clear, so we concluded that it has an 
equality incidence on income-distribution. While freedom of trade illustrates a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient, export and openness shows dissimilar results; institutional 
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and political liberalisation have a negative impact and in the same vein, economic freedom 
has a negative income-redistributive effect.  
The “before and after” analysis shows that financial liberalization has made considerable 
progress toward decreasing income inequality particularly in the short run while the effect of 
trade liberalizations has been less significant 
 In general, this study provides a variegated picture, findings tend to suggest that overall the 
reforms have increased income inequality in African countries.  It would be risky to prescribe 
a general policy because of the diversity of the country.  However, African countries’ better 
performance can be attributed to a combination of policies. For example avoiding the Marco 
price mixture of real exchange rate appreciation and high domestic interest rates; having 
capital controls and prudential financial regulations which would enable them  to contain the 
negative consequence of capital flows; putting a system in place to direct export between 
African countries and encouraging sub regional integration agreement. The government 
should put in place countervailing social policies in order to withstand social coherence and 
smooth the adverse transition of liberalisation policies. 
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Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of Institutional Index   (Instidex) 
Principal 
Components 
 Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 
 V & A R.L R.Q G.E PS CC    
First  P.C  0.369 0.435 0.412 0.425 0.388 0.416 0.784 0.784 4.705 
Second  P.C  -0.690 0.103 0.258 0.436 -0.453 0.227 0.083 0.867 0.499 
Third P.C  -0.591 0.187 -0.299 -0.051 0.724 0.002 0.054 0.922 0.327 
P.C: Principal Component. V& A: Voice & Accountability. R.L:Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality.  G.E: Government Effectiveness.    
PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table2: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum No.Obser. 
  
     
Inequality  GINI Coefficient  43.104 6.828 29.760 67.400 356 
       
Financial 
Liberalization 
KAOPEN  -0.505 1.278 -1.843 2.477 392 
Foreign Direct Investment  2.777 4.252 -8.629 36.114 346 
       
Trade 
Liberalization 
Trade  68.687 29.967 21.574 187.68 401 
Exports  30.245 14.618 5.820 69.032 401 
       
Institutional & 
Political 
Liberalization  
Institutional Index 0.088 2.152 -4.569 5.233 320 
Polity IV  1.857 5.106 -7.000 10.000 420 
       
Other 
liberalizations  
Freedom to Trade  6.060 0.917 3.400 8.100 250 
Economic Freedom   6.118 0.632 4.710 7.820 250 
       
 
Control 
Variables  
 
Inflation 7.239 9.496 -100.00 46.561 395 
Government Expenditure 4.304 10.670 -34.882 61.364 298 
Economic Prosperity  4.273 3.710 -16.740 27.462 420 
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Niger, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Burundi. 
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 Table 3: Correlation analysis 
             
GINI KAOPEN FDI Trade Exports Instidex Polity IV T Free Eco.Free Inflation Gov.Ex GDPg  
1.000 -0.032 0.094 0.144 0.154 0.255 0.352 0.063 0.273 0.044 0.090 -0.148 GINI 
 1.000 0.060 0.049 0.113 0.320 0.120 0.512 0.673 0.137 0.039 0.077 KAOPEN 
  1.000 0.434 0.117 0.095 0.111 0.267 0.258 -0.177 0.109 0.110 FDI 
   1.000 0.843 0.417 0.258 0.445 0.335 -0.040 0.023 -0.024 Trade 
    1.000 0.446 0.167 0.458 0.370 -0.007 -0.002 -0.070 Exports 
     1.000 0.374 0.557 0.674 0.016 0.036 0.107 Instidex 
      1.000 0.245 0.254 0.124 0.024 0.032 Polity IV 
       1.000 0.756 0.200 0.036 0.075 TFree 
        1.000 0.067 0.090 0.098 EcoFree 
         1.000 -0.083 0.008 Inflation 
          1.000 0.208 Gov.Ex. 
           1.000 GDPg 
             
   GINI: Income Inequality Index. KAOPEN: De Jure measure of Capital Openness. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Instidex: Institutional Development Index. Polity IV: Measure of  Political liberalization.  
  TFree: Freedom to Trade. EcoFree: Economic Freedom. Gov. Ex: Government Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth rate.  
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Table 4: Variable definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  Definition Source 
Gini Income inequality  WIDER-WIID and WDI 
KOPEN Capital Account Openness : is based on 
the four binary dummy variables 
reported in the IMF Annual Report on 
exchange restriction  
(AREAER) 
Chinn and Ito (2010) 
Financial liberalisation 2 Accounting for current account 
openness : Foreign direct investment (% 
of GDP) 
WDI (WorldBank) 
Trade  liberalisation 1 Openness (import + export ) of good and 
service (% of GDP) 
WDI (WorldBank) 
Trade liberalisation 2 Export of good and service (% of GDP) WDI (WorldBank) 
Trade liberalisation 3 Freedom of Trade index combines 
measures of trade taxes, tariff rates and 
trade barriers and capital control to 
create a composite index 
 Fraser institute (Gwartney et 
al. (2011) 
Institutional Liberalisation First principal component of  
government effectiveness, corruption 
control, rule of law, regulation quality, 
voice and accountability and political 
stability 
World bank (2011) 
Political Liberalisation  Is an indicator of “combined polity 
score” which varies from 10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic)  
Marshall et al., 2003 
Economic Freedom The components are as follows: 
economic freedom representing, taxes 
on international trade (international 
trade tax revenues as % of trade sector; 
mean tariff rate and standard deviation 
of tariff rates); regulatory trade barriers 
(non-tariff trade barriers and the 
compliance cost of exporting and 
importing); the size of  the trade sector 
in relation to that expected; black market 
exchange rates and international market 
capital controls (‘foreign ownership 
investment’ restrictions and capital 
controls). 
Fraser institute (Gwartney et 
al. (2011) 
Inflation  Consumer Price Index  WDI (WorldBank) 
Government Expenditure  Government final expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
WDI (WorldBank) 
 Growth rate of GDP  Real GDP per capita. WDI (WorldBank) 
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Table 5: Two-step System GMM estimates (Full data with no overlapping intervals)  
 
 
Notes. */**/*** significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]: P-values. GINI: 
Inequality coefficient. OIR Overidentifying restrictions. Instidex: Institutional index. Polity IV: Political liberalization 
measure. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Kaopen: de jure measure of capital openess 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: GINI 
coefficient 
A B C D E F G H  
         
Constant 5.803 10.382*  10.987 9.539* 15.979  12.371  10.441  10.317  
 (0.519) (1.756)  (1.231) (1.728) (1.079)  (1.446)  (1.004)  (0.785)  
GINI_1 0.898*** 0.742***  1.021*** 0.840*** 0.851***  0.895***  0.934***  0.799***  
 (3.357) (5.769)  (5.499) (7.344) (3.913)  (5.436)  (4.172)  (3.015)  
  
             
Financial 
Liberalization 
 
 
Kaopen -0.030 ---  0.282 --- ---  ---  0.064  -0.114  
 (-0.079)   (0.783)      (0.197)  (-0.298)  
 FDI 0.108 0.047  0.261*** 0.137* 0.247  0.207*  0.190**  0.034  
 (1.334) (0.584)  (2.764) (1.701) (1.232)  (1.809)  (2.266)  (0.516)  
Trade 
Liberalization  
 
 
Trade  -0.0002 0.004  -0.016* --- ---  ---  ---  ---  
 (-0.013) (0.344)  (-1.778)          
 Exports --- ---  --- --- -0.017  -0.025  -0.018  ---  
      (-0.366)  (-0.809)  (-0.699)    
Institutional 
&Political 
Liberalization 
 
 
Instidex -0.035 0.129  0.229 0.235 0.259  0.256  0.215  ---  
 (-0.159) (0.303)  (1.539) (0.976) (0.757)  (1.000)  (1.335)    
 
 
Polity 
IV 
0.064 0.147*  0.049 0.119 0.186  0.109  0.075  0.166  
 (0.553) (1.706)  (0.616) (1.565) (1.258)  (1.186)  (0.782)  (0.901)  
                
Freedom of Trade  -0.339 -0.088  --- --- -1.570  ---  ---  ---  
 (-0.965) (-0.345)    (-0.791)        
Economic Freedom  --- ---  -1.864 -0.481 ---  -1.230  -1.250  -0.306  
    (-1.145) (-0.475)   (-1.022)  (-0.888)  (-0.365)  
             
Inflation  -0.005 ---  --- --- ---  ---  ---  -0.005  
 (-0.121)           (-0.115)  
Government Expenditure  --- ---  0.033 0.047 0.049  0.045  0.037  0.023  
    (0.755) (1.215) (1.229)  (1.167)  (0.758)  (0.410)  
             
Economic Prosperity  0.003 0.001  -0.013 -0.074 -0.084  -0.059  -0.025  -0.052  
 (0.063) (0.069)  (-0.207) (-1.208) (-1.539)  (-0.905)  (-0.416)  (-1.010)  
              
Test for AR(2) errors 1.130 1.155  1.242 1.159 0.821  1.181  1.213  0.394  
 [0.258] [0.2481]  [0.214] [0.246] [0.411]  [0.237]  [0.225]  [0.693]  
Sargan  OIR test  8.197 10.317  4.565 4.756 6.265  4.905  4.358  7.413  
 [1.000] [1.000]  [1.000] [1.000] [1.000]  [1.000]  [1.000]  [1.000]  
 
            
Wald(joint) test 522.1*** 251.6***  700.5*** 717.3*** 3465***  397.0***  841.4***  170.6***  
 [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
              
Number of Instruments  51 49  49 47 48  48  49  53  
Number of Countries  21 21  17 17 17  17  17  18  
Number of Observations  132 138  109 109 109  109  109  125  
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Table 6: Two-step System GMM estimates (Two year non overlapping intervals) 
 *;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]:P-values. GINI: Inequality coefficient. OIR: 
Overidentifying restrictions. Instidex: Institutional liberalization  index. Polity IV: Political liberalization measure.  FDI: Foreign Direct 
Investment. Kaopen: de jure measure of capital account openness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dep.variable: 
GINIcoefficient 
 A B C D E F G H 
         
Constant 17.853** -20.03** -25.444* -16.06** -14.628* 16.863** -9.226 -25.209* 
 (2.335) (-2.212) (-1.787) (-2.474) (-1.759) (2.454) (-1.085) (-1.854) 
GINI_1 0.905*** 0.928*** 0.905*** 0.819*** 0.783*** 0.899*** 0.800*** 1.019*** 
 (9.441) (3.963) (7.988) (12.10) (9.202) (9.043) (8.994) (3.489) 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Kaopen 0.504 --- -0.744** -0.688** -0.770* 0.386 -0.620 -0.559 
 (1.206)  (-2.016) (-2.280) (-1.877) (0.921) (-1.286) (-1.101) 
FDI --- -0.30*** -0.21*** -0.220** -0.195** --- -0.148* -0.206* 
  (-2.813) (-2.982) (-2.333) (-2.127)  (-1.882) (-1.827) 
Trade Liberalization    
    
 
  
Trade  -0.006 0.005 -0.0005 -0.004 --- --- --- --- 
 (-0.578) (0.427) (-0.052) (-0.282)     
Exports --- --- --- --- -0.029 -0.017 -0.039 -0.026 
     (-0.937) (-0.592) (-1.355) (-1.040) 
Institutional 
&Political 
Liberalization 
Instidex --- -0.094 -0.121 --- 0.058 0.233 --- -0.057 
  (-0.504) (-0.528)  (0.297) (0.907)  (-0.202) 
Polity IV 0.141 -0.008 -0.019 --- --- 0.103 0.065* -0.067 
 (1.212) (-0.067) (-0.220)   (0.966) (1.749) (-0.373) 
          
Freedom of Trade  -2.161* --- --- --- --- -2.014** --- --- 
(-1.855)     (-2.562)   
Economic Freedom  --- 3.619** 4.668** 3.81*** 3.933** --- 2.974 3.954** 
 (2.224) (2.479) (2.998) (2.322)  (1.590) (2.520) 
Inflation  -0.029 -0.018 --- 0.0137 --- --- --- -0.019 
(-0.319) (-0.339)  (0.352)    (-0.342) 
Government Expenditure  0.080*** 0.065** 0.073*** 0.082*** 0.086*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.060* 
(3.369) (2.245) (3.309) (3.164) (3.827) (3.123) (3.762) (1.795) 
Economic Prosperity  -0.063 0.114 0.080 0.028 0.021 -0.007 --- 0.167 
(-0.331) (0.560) (0.603) (0.216) (0.176) (-0.045)  (0.645) 
         
Test for AR(2) errors 0.023 0.397 0.232 0.214 0.134 0.073 0.008 0.230 
[0.981] [0.691] [0.815] [0.830] [0.893] [0.941] [0.993] [0.818] 
Sargan  OIR test  10.821 5.345 5.260 8.121 9.040 13.991 9.886 6.332 
 [0.984] [1.000] [1.000] [0.999] [0.998] [0.927] [0.996] [0.999] 
Wald(joint) test 6466*** 1767*** 3063*** 1120*** 529.6*** 2554*** 698.2*** 3750*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
         
Number of Instruments  32 35 35 34 34 32 33 36 
Number of Countries  20 18 18 18 18 20 18 18 
Number of Observations  84 75 75 75 75 84 75 75 
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Table 7: Two-step System GMM estimates (Three year non overlapping intervals)  
Dep. variable: 
 GINI  
coefficient 
 A B C D E F G H 
          
Constant 13.91** -13.688 -18.205* 10.458 1.606 -14.023 -17.347* -8.368* 
(2.127) (-1.498) (-1.865) (1.009) (0.251) (-1.467) (-1.859) (-1.737) 
GINI_1 0.920*** 0.744*** 0.727*** 0.880*** 0.924*** 0.857*** 0.720*** 0.909*** 
(7.388) (3.829) (4.601) (8.571) (6.839) (5.187) (3.606) (21.23) 
 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Kaopen 0.319 -0.914** -0.97*** 0.222 --- --- -1.005** -0.414** 
(0.958) (-1.985) (-2.748) (0.646)   (-2.107) (-2.141) 
FDI --- -0.226 -0.213 -0.203* --- -0.271 -0.211 -0.195 
 (-0.739) (-0.901) (-1.927)  (-1.490) (-0.735) (-1.147) 
Trade 
Liberalization  
Trade  -0.017 -0.050 -0.042 -0.025 --- --- --- --- 
(-1.006) (-1.490) (-1.535) (-0.996)     
Exports --- --- --- --- -0.050** -0.075 -0.090 -0.059* 
   (-2.339) (-1.313) (-1.182) (-1.927) 
Institutional 
&Political 
Liberalization 
Instidex --- --- --- --- 0.141 -0.064 --- 0.162 
    (0.640) (-0.246)  (0.996) 
Polity IV 0.039 0.082 --- --- -0.026 0.077 0.081 0.020 
(0.416) (1.049)   (-0.378) (1.299) (1.231) (0.263) 
Freedom of Trade  -1.538** --- --- -0.562 --- --- --- --- 
(-2.047)   (-0.560)     
Economic Freedom  --- 4.393* 5.189** --- 0.546 3.649*** 5.125** 2.334** 
 (1.837) (2.574)  (0.516) (3.318) (2.013) (2.296) 
Inflation  --- --- --- --- --- -0.187* --- -0.046 
     (-1.680)  (-0.753) 
Government Expenditure  0.079** 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.108** 0.121*** 0.140*** 0.156*** --- 
(1.995) (3.243) (3.376) (2.252) (2.924) (3.532) (3.106)  
Economic Prosperity  -0.017 -0.010 -0.085 0.009 -0.118 0.114 -0.137 --- 
(-0.087) (-0.020) (-0.331) (0.036) (-0.514) (0.284) (-0.272)  
Test for AR(2) errors -0.486 0.758 0.867 -0.033 -0.421 0.445 0.976 -0.887 
[0.626] [0.448 ] [0.385] [0.973] [0.673] [0.655] [0.328] [0.374] 
Sargan  OIR test  7.724 11.999 11.759 8.579 8.393 6.620 11.253 6.808 
[0.460] [0.151] [0.162] [0.379] [0.3960] [0.578] [0.187] [0.557] 
Wald(joint) test 700.4*** 1231*** 967.7*** 1557*** 2007*** 1582*** 1388*** 6387*** 
[0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
        
Number of Instruments  16 17 16 16 16 18 17 17 
Number of Countries  18 16 16 16 18 16 16 20 
Number of Observations  54 49 49 49 54 49 49 61 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]:P-values. GINI: Inequality coefficient. OIR: 
Overidentifying restrictions. Instidex: Institutional liberalization  index. Polity IV: Political liberalization measure.  FDI: Foreign Direct 
Investment. Kaopen: de jure measure of capital account openness. 
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Table 8: Change in Gini index (income inequality) before and after Financial Liberalization. 
Note: the ‘before10’ or ‘after10’ is the average of Gini index 10 years before or after transition.   The ‘d10’ is the difference between the  
Two periods. Same application for ‘before5’. ‘after5’ and ‘d5’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries Fin. Lib.Year Before 10 after 10 d10 Before 5 after 5 d5 
Botswana 1996 55.6 44.7 -10.9 48.5 47.5 -1 
Burkina Faso 1996 51 42.31 8.69 49.9 43.95 -5.95 
Burundi 1996 n/a 33.27 n/a 33.33 42.39 9.06 
Cameroon 1996 n/a 38.91 n/a 55.8 44.56 -11.24 
Cote d Ivoire 1996 48.2 41.5 -6.7 45.9 44 -1.9 
Egypt. Arab Rep. 1991 37 32.7 -4.3 33 30.13 -2.87 
Gabon 1996 n/a 41.5 n/a 52.38 50.38 -2.00 
Gahana 1996 48.5 42.76 -5.74 52.5 50.9 -1.6 
Kenya 1993 57.3 45.43 -11.87 55.61 45.5 -10.11 
Lesotho 2003 51.16 n/a n/a 51.15 55.61 4.46 
Madagascar 1996 48.5 47.5 -1 43.36 45.4 2.04 
Malawi 1995 59.9 46.02 -13.88 49.8 48.9 -0.9 
Mali 1996 n/a 38.99 n/a 36.5 40.01 3.51 
Mauritania 1995 42.4 39.04 -3.36 39.06 38.9 -0.16 
Mauritius 1993 47.7 39.5 -8.2 39.8 40.7 0.9 
Morocco 1993 48.4 40.63 -7.77 39.46 40.8 1.34 
Niger 1996 39 34.04 -4.96 37 42.5 5.5 
Nigeria 1995 48.7 42.9 -5.8 44.9 45.7 0.8 
Senegal 1996 53.6 39.16 -14.44 54.14 41.25 -12.89 
South Africa 1983 51 59.33 8.33 47 45 -2 
Tanzania 1996 52 37.58 -14.42 33.83 34.62 0.79 
Tunisia 1986 48.5 41.66 -6.84 43 41.66 -1.34 
Uganda 1990 n/a 43.07 n/a 44.3 37.13 -7.17 
Zambia 1994 n/a 50.74 n/a 52.61 53.44 0.83 
 
       
Average  49.4 41.9 -6.1 45.1 43.8 -1.3 
Median Value  48.6 41.5 -6.7 45.4 44.0 -0.9 
standard Deviation  5.8 5.8 0 7.3 5.8 1`.5 
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Table 9: Change in Gini index (income inequality) before and after trade liberalization 
Countries Year Trade. Lib.  before10 after 10 d10 before5 after 5 d 5 
Botswana 1985 52 50.2 -1.8 47.5 45.3 -2.2 
Burkina Faso 1991 n/a 39.6 n/a 50.71 49.9 -0.81 
Burundi 1999 33.33 33.27 -0.06 40.5 33.27 -7.23 
Cameroon 1993 49 44.56 -4.44 55.8 46.82 -8.98 
Cote d Ivoire 1994 45.21 44 -1.21 37.16 44.4 7.24 
Egypt. Arab Rep. 1995 37 31.44 -5.56 30 31.7 1.7 
Gahana 1985 n/a 51.5 n/a 51.3 52.5 1.2 
Kenya 1993 57 45 -12 44.6 45.5 0.9 
Mali 1988 36.5 36 -0.5 n/a 50.5 n/a 
Mauritania 1992 49 39 -10 n/a 39.04 n/a 
Mauritius 1968 n/a 35.2 n/a n/a 41.9 n/a 
Morocco 1984 59 39.5 -19.5 39.7 38.2 -1.5 
Niger 1994 n/a 43.8 n/a 35.9 41.5 5.6 
Senegal 1993 n/a 41.2 n/a 63.9 41.4 -22.5 
South Africa 1991 49 56.7 7.7 49 54.5 5.5 
Tanzania 1995 52 37.58 -14.4 33.84 34.62 0.78 
Tunisia 1989 36 40.24 4.24 43 41.66 -1.34 
Uganda 1988 39.6 44.3 4.7 44.3 42.6 -1.7 
Zambia 1993 n/a 42.08 n/a 59.1 53.4 -5.7 
 
       
Average 
 
45.7 41.9 -4.1 45.4 43.6 -1.8 
Median Value 
 
49.0 41.2 -1.8 44.5 42.6 -1.1 
standard Deviation  
 
8.5 6.3 2.2 9.4 6.6 2.8 
 
Note: the ‘before10’ or ‘after10’ is the average of Gini index 10 years before or after transition.   The ‘d10’ is the difference between the two 
periods. Same application for ‘before5’. ‘after5’ and ‘d5’. 
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Fig.1. Gini index and Liberalization Policies in a cross section of countries: Partial regression of Gini index and trade liberalization indicators 
(trade freedom, trade openness, export); financial liberalization indicators (capital account openness, FDI as GDP); institutional liberalization 
indicators, (instidex, Polity IV). 
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Fig 2. Poverty headcount ratio at 1.25$ a day (PPP) and Liberalisation policies in a cross section of countries; Partial regression of PHR and 
Liberalisation policies 
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Fig 3. Poverty headcount ratio at 2$ a day (PPP) and Liberalisation policies in a cross section of countries; Partial regression of PHC at 2 a 
day and Liberalisation policies 
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